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Innovation-driven change 
Modes of innovation 
• Forms economic integration 
Creative Destruction 
•  Political and Economic 
Skill-biased technical change 
•  CTIs only? 
Long-term productivity gains 
•   During the transition? 
•  Distribution? 
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What is Bayh-Dole? 
• Who owns patents from federally 
funded research? 
• Before: discretion of agency 
• After: research contractors 
• Universities 
Patenting in the U.S. 
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Bayh-Dole Regime (BDR) 
• Stevenson-Wydler 1980 (PL 96-480) 
• FTTA 1986 (PL 99-502) 
• CAFC 1982 (PL 98-462) 
• NCRA 1984 (PL 98-462) 
• Hatch-Waxman 1984 (PL 98-417) 
• Diamond v. Chakrabarty 1980 (447 U.S. 303) 
• Diamond v. Diehr 1981 (450 U.S. 175) 
• Reforms in Financial Sector (ERISA, 74) 
• Reforms in International Commerce (Special 301, 
1994) 
BDR Effects: Efficiency 
• Quality of patents 
• Crowding-out basic research 
• Republic of science 
– Tragedy of anti-commons 
– Research tools 
• Perverse incentives 
– Cultural change? 
BDR Effects: Tradition 
• Ideal type science: Mertonian norms. 
• Ideal type university = traditional type 
– Public disclosure of research 
– Faculty defined research agenda 
– Impartiality of research (peer review) 
• New values 
– Secrecy 
– Donor defined agenda 
– Conflicts of interest 
The role of the university 
Richard Levin (American Council of Education March 6, 2011) 
 
• “Congress did not intend to give us the 
right to maximize profits” 
• “…it gave us private-property rights for a 
public purpose: to ensure that the 
benefits of research are widely shared.”  
BDR Effects: What is missing? 
• How are the benefits of innovation 
distributed? 
• Are there distributional outcomes in 
T2? 
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Nexus: innovation-distribution 
• Asymmetries of inputs tend to 
reproduce in outputs. 
• Entrepreneurship 
– Creative destruction. 
– Small businesses 
• Industrial Organization of high-tech 
sectors. 
Modes of innovation 
• Are there asymmetries in university tech 
transfer? 
• Is tech transfer a catalyst of 
entrepreneurship? 
– inadvertently strengthening incumbents 
market power? 
• Are high-tech industries concentrated or 
competitive? 
OTTs: Org-isomorphism 
Distribution of Licensing Income 

Research Funds & Licensing Income 
Research Funds & Licensing Income 
Asymmetries 
Distribution of licensing income 
• Of 218 OTTs, 132 at a loss 
• Stable top 40 earners 
• Input-output asymmetries 
Why stay in T2 business? 
– Not current but expected revenues 
– Internal: Manage existing IP portfolio. Train 
faculty. 
– External: Partner in economic development 
– Public mission: profit motive in check with other 
values 

Research is not a lottery 
• Re-balance research portfolio 
• Cultivate entrepreneurial spirit in campus 
• Organizational incentives 
 
  Also… 
 
• New T2 business model 
New T2 models 
• Socially responsible licensing 
• “Nurturing” start-ups 
– Legal: IP portfolio 
– Incubator services 
– Experience in negotiation 
– Networking (investors, suppliers) 
A new OTT model 
Pros 
• Easier than selling 
licenses 
• Higher deferred 
income 
• Prestige: fostering 
entrepreneurship 
Cons 
• Hard to sell 
lackluster start-ups 
• Early large negative 
cash-flow 
• Univ. going out of 
traditional roles 
Lessons from history 
• Venture Capital: evidence from survey 
data (Gans, Hsu, Stern, 2000) 
• Biotechnology 
• Creative destruction 
– Baumol: “Why Computers Get Cheaper 
and Health Care Doesn't” 
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Three levels 
• University 
• Federal Agency 
• Congress: changes to the statute 
Universities 
• Explain role of university beyond 
“economic rationalization” 
– Education: 
• Labor force but also consumers. 
• Civic education. 
– Public mission not-for-profit character 
– Equal opportunity (social mobility) 
 
Universities 
• Emphasis on best practices (9 points) 
• Socially responsible licensing programs 
• Preference for non-exclusive licenses 
– Research tools, humanitarian, environmental. 
– Multi-site research and commercialization 
– Patent Pools 
• Nurturing start-ups: Longer horizon for 
investments 
Policy: Federal Agencies 
• Declare preference for non-exclusive 
licenses from their research grants 
• Invite grantees to voluntarily opt-out 
from aggressive licensing practices 
– E.g. Reach-through fees 
• More multi-site research grants 
• Sponsor patent-pools 
Policy: Congress 
• Reaffirm the role of the university as broker-
agent 
• Create incentives for university cooperation 
• Relax “exceptional circumstances” (35 U.S.C. 
§202-a-ii)  
– For agencies to limit or cancel rights to inventions 
• Expand powers for “marching-rights” (35 
U.S.C. §203) 
– To control of monopolistic prices 
